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DEATH OF AN ACCOUNTANT: THE JURY CONVICTS
ARTHUR ANDERSEN OF OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
STEPHAN LANDSMAN*
INTRODUCTION
One of the functions of the American jury has been to serve as
an agent of legal and social change. Precisely when and how the jury
becomes involved in transformative decision making has only occa-
sionally been scrutinized. What seems clear is that a great deal turns
on the details of a given case and the historical context in which that
case is tried. In an effort to explore the work of the jury as change
agent, this Article will examine the recent trial of the Arthur Ander-
sen accounting firm on a charge of obstruction of justice.
The Article is divided into seven sections. The first considers the
commonly shared, though erroneous, belief that the Andersen case
would result in a swift and resounding victory for the government
because of the precipitous decline of the stock market, the widely
publicized misconduct of an array of large business entities, the
collapse of the Enron Corporation, and Andersen's exceedingly
suspicious conduct in reaction to Enron's failure. The second section
details the slow and laborious deliberations of the Andersen jury,
which took ten days to agree on Andersen's guilt. The third section
explores why the jury found the case so difficult, focusing special
attention on questions of witness credibility, the appeal of arguments
portraying Andersen as an underdog, and juror reluctance to embrace
what was, in essence, a death sentence for the accounting firm. The
next section goes on to analyze why the jury may have overcome its
doubts and convicted. Section five argues that the Andersen verdict
may be a watershed in American legal thinking about the misconduct
of large corporations and their advisors. The sixth section then
focuses attention on the disturbing conduct of federal prosecutors as
they fought to convict in the politically charged Andersen case. The
* Robert A. Clifford Professor of Tort Law and Social Policy, DePaul University College
of Law.
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Article concludes with some thoughts about the social significance of
the trial and jury decision.
I. A SLAM-DUNK
Pundits across America suggested in the days before Arthur An-
dersen's jury trial on a charge of* obstruction of justice that the
government's victory would be emphatic and swift-as basketball
argot has it, a "slam-dunk."1 "Specialists" quoted by the Wall Street
Journal described the matter as "open-and-shut. '2 USA Today
declared that a Department of Justice victory was "widely expected. '3
And Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant for the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), in the wake of a guilty plea by a key
Andersen partner, David Duncan, and using a somewhat different
(and perhaps fractured) sporting metaphor, described the plea deal as
"a grand-slam hit."' 4
It is not hard to understand why expert commentators and ordi-
nary citizens alike might have expected the government to have had
little trouble convicting Arthur Andersen. To begin, the news was
dominated by reports likely to jaundice Americans' views about
business defendants. The trial, which began on May 6, 2002, came at
the end of a catastrophic stock market tumble and amidst an astound-
ing flurry of business scandals. The explosive decline in the Nasdaq
Composite Index looked "surprisingly like the U.S. stock market
around the 1929 crash"5 with the Index losing more than 72% of its
value. 6 At the heart of the decline was the bursting of the speculative
dot-corn "bubble" in which investors displayed "irrational exuber-
1. The New York Daily News used this term at the end of the trial to describe "some
observers," beliefs about the ultimate outcome of the case. Judith Schoolman, Andersen Fights
for its Life, Obstruction Trial Begins in Houston, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), May 7, 2002, at 61. The
Houston Chronicle used the same term to describe prosecutors' pretrial predictions about the
case. David Ivanovich & Steve Brewer, The Andersen Verdict, Verdict May Aid Government's
Case Against Enron. HOUS. CHRON., June 16, 2002, at Al.
2. Richard B. Schmitt & Jonathan Weil, Government Takes Strong Case into Andersen
Trial, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2002, at Cl.
3. Greg Farrell, Neither Side Blinked, So Justice Day Has Arrived, USA TODAY, May 6,
2002, at Bi.
4. John R. Wilke et al., Duncan Guilty Plea Roils Andersen, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2002, at
A3.
5. E.S. Browning, Abreast of the Market, Stock Recovery May Take Time, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 15, 2002, at Cl.
6. Id.
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ance" for any stock related to the internet. 8 Serious corporate
chicanery appeared to reach unprecedented proportions at about the
same time. Such major corporations as Tyco, Adelphia, Global
Crossing, Williams Companies, WorldCom, Dynegy, J.P. Morgan
Chase, Citigroup, AOL Time Warner, and Lucent Technologies were
all accused by shareholders of serious misconduct.9 Additionally, a
considerable number of major companies had, since 1995, entered
into agreements to settle comparable claims by paying more than
$100 million in each case. These included Cendant, Waste Manage-
ment, Bank of America, 3Com, Rite Aid, Micro Strategy, Informix,
Sunbeam, Conseco, and Ikon.10
In many ways the Andersen case seemed to epitomize this turbu-
lent era. It began with the collapse of the energy trading behemoth,
Enron Corporation, which at one time was the seventh largest corpo-
ration in America." Enron started to unravel in the summer of 2001
after the Wall Street Journal questioned a number of its business and
accounting practices.12 By mid-October the financial media were in
full cry, and Enron stock was in dramatic retreat. 3 In the two weeks
leading up to October 24, 2001, the date that Andrew Fastow, En-
ron's chief financial officer, was furloughed (later to be indicted for
fraud), 4 the company's stock lost more than half its value. 5 The
plunge never abated, and on December 2, 2001, Enron filed for
bankruptcy protection.
When Enron collapsed, it buried not only itself but Arthur An-
dersen, its long-time auditor. Andersen was one of the so-called "big
five" accounting giants in the United States. It was, in 2001, a ninety-
year-old organization with a history of rectitude built on its early
7. Joseph Rebello, Do Markets Really Take Any Stock in Greenspan, WALL ST. J., June
24, 2003, at C13 (noting this phrase was originally used by Alan Greenspan).
8. Stephen E. Frank & E.S. Browning, A Year After the Peak: Bursting of the Tech Bubble
Has a Familiar "Pop" to It, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at Cl.
9. See Jonathan D. Glater, From Investor Fury, A Legal Bandwagon, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2002, § 3 (Money and Business/Financial Desk), at 1.
10. Id.
11. Jonathan Weil et al., Guilty Plea by Enron's Kopper Increases Scrutiny of Ex-CFO,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2002, at Al.
12. Anne Brady, Andersen Was Lax in Auditing of Baptist Group, Witness Says, WALL ST.
J., May 2, 2002, at C3.
13. See, e.g., John Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Enron Jolt: Investments, Assets Generate
Big Loss, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2001, at Cl.
14. Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-Enron Finance Chief Is Indicted on 78 Counts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
1, 2002, at C2.
15. Jathon Sapsford & Suzanne McGee, Credit Markets, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2001, at C14.
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leaders' refusal to curry favor with large clients by soft-pedaling
negative accounting and auditing judgments. 16 Andersen had grown
into a multinational partnership with more than 28,000 employees. 7
Despite its history, in the three or four years preceding Enron's
fall, Andersen had faced a series of difficulties. It had been closely
associated with several major scandals including those at Waste
Management, Inc. and Sunbeam Corporation. In Waste Management,
"aggressive" accounting practices led to a $1.43 billion overstatement
of pretax earnings and a $178 million understatement of tax expenses
between 1992 and 1996.18 When these facts were disclosed, the SEC
vigorously investigated not only Waste Management but also Arthur
Andersen. Eventually, the SEC proceeded against Andersen, charg-
ing it with failing to maintain its independence and issuing materially
false and misleading audit reports.19 Rather than fight those charges,
Andersen entered into a consent decree in which it neither admitted
nor denied the accusations against it. The SEC censured Andersen
and the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia levied a
$7 million fine against the firm and entered an injunction prohibiting
it from violating "Section 10(b), which [is] the anti-fraud provision [of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,] ... in the future." 20 The
Sunbeam case was similar. Arthur Andersen's engagement partner
on the account, Phillip Harlow, signed off on financial reports that
were materially false and misleading because they overstated earnings
(by some $60 million or 30% of profits)." When this was disclosed, it
led to the bankruptcy of Sunbeam Corporation and a fraud accusa-
tion against Harlow. 2 Arthur Andersen's troubles did not end with
those two cases. At the time Enron began to come apart, Andersen
16. See Ken Brown & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Sad Account: Andersen's Fall From Grace Is a
Tale of Greed and Miscues, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2002, at Al.
17. This number is drawn from lead defense counsel Rusty Hardin's remarks at a pretrial
hearing. United States District Court Transcript, 2002 Extra LEXIS 447, at *20, United States
v. Arthur Andersen, 2002 Extra LEXIS 437 (S.D. Tex. June 15, 2002) (No. H-02-121) [hereinaf-
ter Andersen Transcript].
18. Portions of the SEC complaint in the Waste Management case were introduced into
evidence during the Andersen trial, including passages making reference to the cited figures.
Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 459, at *29-*32 (testimony of Barbara
Jeanne Sullivan, FBI Special Agent).
19. See supra note 16.
20. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 454, at *183 (testimony of
Thomas Newkirk, Associate Director of the Division of Enforcement of the SEC).
21. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 454, at *160.
22. The charges against Harlow are pending. For a description of the status of the
Sunbeam case as of September 2002, see Floyd Norris, Former Sunbeam Chief Agrees to Ban
and a Fine of $500,000, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2002, at Cl.
[Vol 78:1203
DEATH OFAN ACCOUNTANT
faced hundreds of millions of dollars in liability for a botched audit of
the Baptist Foundation of Arizona, 23 as well as investigations of
auditing improprieties in Connecticut and a number of other states.2 4
Enron's collapse was a noisy and public affair in which many
prominent politicians were implicated. Enron officials had an excep-
tionally close relationship with the President of the United States. In
fact, Enron "had long been a major financial backer of Mr. Bush. '25
Enron's largess extended beyond the White House to many other
Republicans as well. Enron's support apparently bought it special
access to sensitive governmental bodies such as Vice President
Richard Cheney's energy committee, although the government has
stubbornly resisted judicial orders to provide documents identifying
exactly who had access to that body.26 Enron used its vast resources
aggressively to lobby for favorable government treatment, expending
$100 million on the task between 1999 and 2001.27 Its reach even
extended to prominent Democrats like Johnny Hayes, an influential
advisor to Al Gore, who was paid at least $100,000 in consulting fees
by Enron.28 All of this was grist for the media mill and made Enron's
failure perhaps the biggest news story of the Bush presidency apart
from the tragic events of September 11, 2001.
News about past indiscretions and political machinations was
augmented by sensational charges that both Enron and Arthur
Andersen employees were seeking to cover up their misconduct by
shredding sensitive documents and deleting critical e-mails and other
computer-based records. Such reports led not only to further press
coverage, but also to a Department of Justice inquiry. The media
frenzy was heightened by the SEC's opening of its formal investiga-
tion (in October 2001), Enron's declaration of bankruptcy (in De-
cember 2001), and Congress's pursuit of public hearings (in January
2002). Shortly before the congressional hearings, Andersen fired its
Enron engagement partner, David Duncan, and sought to blame all
23. See Anne Brady, Andersen Was Lax in Auditing of Baptist Group, Witness Says, WALL
ST. J., May 2, 2002, at C3.
24. See Richard B. Schmitt et al., Glitches Imperil Possible Deal for Andersen, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 17, 2002, at C1.
25. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Senator Releases Documents On Gore Aide's Enron Ties, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, at C7.
26. Katharine Q. Seelye, Judge Again Bars Effort To Keep Cheney Files Secret, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2002, at A30.
27. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Senate Panel Says Watchdog Missed Many Enron Clues, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2002, at C2.
28. Oppel, supra note 25, at C7.
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problems arising out of the case on him. Prominent Andersen
officials C.E. Andrews and Dorsey Baskin, Jr., in a statement to
Congress, declared:
We should address the question why Andersen took the forceful
action it did regarding Mr. Duncan. In our view, Mr. Duncan's ac-
tions reflected a failure of judgment that is simply unacceptable in a
person who has major responsibilities at our firm. He was the lead
engagement partner for a significant client exercising very substan-
tial responsibility within the firm. Yet our investigation indicated
that he directed the purposeful destruction of a very substantial
volume of documents and in doing so he gave every appearance of
destroying these materials in anticipation of a government request
for documents. This is the kind of conduct that Andersen cannot
tolerate. The case of Mr. Duncan was clear enough to allow us to
draw conclusions about his responsibility at an early stage of the
inquiry .29
In March 2002, the government indicted the Andersen firm on
one count of obstruction of justice because of its alleged destruction
of documentary and electronic data. Andersen chose an aggressive
response, demanding the earliest possible trial date-a decision that
may have been motivated by the dire straits in which the firm found
itself as clients abandoned it and the possibility of a total shutdown
loomed.30 The case was assigned to Federal Judge Linda Harmon of
Houston, who granted Andersen's speedy trial request and set a May
6, 2002 trial date (a mere forty-seven days from the date of the
hearing on Andersen's motion).31 On April 6, as the trial loomed,
David Duncan entered his plea agreement with the government. On
April 26, as the pool of potential jurors was being assembled for
examination after having answered an elaborate written question-
naire, Andersen's lead attorney, Rusty Hardin, sought a postpone-
ment of the trial, claiming that the venire had been tainted by the
nature and tenor of news coverage. Hardin explained:
The Court is aware that at the beginning of this week both sides
with the Court reviewed juror questionnaires that showed, at least
in my 27 years as a lawyer, the highest percentage of people who
had already formed an opinion of a defendant's guilt in my practice.
As the Court knows, of the approximately 150 returns you received
approximately a third of those addressed an opinion to open-ended
29. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 459, at *15-*16 (testimony of
Barbara Jeanne Sullivan).
30. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands: The Accountants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002,
at Cl.
31. Id.
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questions that didn't give them any facts that they believe Arthur
Andersen was guilty. Many of them, as you know, actually filled in
the views of the case, much of which matched the Government's
theory of this case as they announced in the indictment, which
clearly shows that an unusually high percentage of a potential jury
panel has not only been exposed to the media coverage of this case
but has accepted the Government's theory, which in many ways has
gone unanswered of [sic] Arthur Andersen other than to continue
to insist that we were not guilty.32
Despite Hardin's plea, the judge ruled, as the government requested,
that the trial commence on schedule. It began May 6, 2002.
The government's case was powerfully strengthened by the sus-
picious nature of Arthur Andersen's conduct, a fact that even Rusty
Hardin admitted when, in his closing, he said: "Did it look suspicious?
You bet."33 Well before the tumultuous events of 2001, the Enron-
Andersen relationship was one that might raise concerns in the mind
of a dispassionate observer. An auditing firm is supposed to maintain
genuine independence from its clients so that its assessments of
financial activity are untainted by friendship, pressure, or profit.
Much in Arthur Andersen's relationship with Enron worked to
undermine independence. Enron hired away no fewer than 125
Andersen accountants. Enron's chief accountant, Richard Causey,
had come from Andersen.34 The practice had become so worrisome
that Duncan asked Causey to stop raiding Andersen personnel. 35 The
interweaving of present and former Andersen accountants created
the potential for troubling alliances.
The steady stream of hirings also appeared to hold out the prom-
ise of lucrative future employment to those Andersen accountants
who could ingratiate themselves to Enron officials. Accountants from
Andersen were lavishly entertained by Enron's corporate officers. At
the highest levels, auditors were whisked off to events like the Mas-
ters' Golf Tournament. This sort of junket was described by one
Andersen partner as "out of the realm of normal relationship-
building," and "potentially inappropriate. 3 6 The Enron engagement
netted Arthur Andersen more than $50 million in billing revenue
32. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 456, at *2-*3 (pretrial
conference statements by Rusty Hardin, lead defense counsel).
33. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 458, at *316 (closing argument by Rusty Hardin).
34. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 450, at *191 (testimony of James Hecker, Andersen Houston
Partner).
35. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 462, at *200-*01 (testimony of David Duncan, Andersen Enron
Engagement Partner).
36. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 450, at *194 (testimony of James Hecker).
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during 2000. Enron was Andersen's second largest client, and, on
both sides, the expectation was that fees would eventually grow to
more than $100 million a year.37 The flow of Enron cash made
Duncan an Andersen star at a very young age.38
Enron used its economic and personal leverage with Arthur An-
dersen to pursue what all involved agreed was a remarkably "aggres-
sive" approach to its accounting.39 The Andersen engagement team,
headed by Duncan, appeared to do what it could to accommodate
Enron's aggressiveness.40 When an Andersen accountant did not
react sympathetically to Enron's efforts to maximize profits or
manipulate accounting rules, there was a significant likelihood that
the accountant would be removed from his or her prestigious Enron
posting. As early as 1998, Enron began to complain about rulings
from Andersen's key accounting policy fixing body, the Professional
Standards Group ("PSG"). Eventually, Enron targeted a member of
the PSG, Carl Bass, for removal. Despite the unprecedented nature
of the removal request, the protests of the most respected members of
the PSG, and the circumvention of the normal Andersen chain of
command, Bass was barred from Enron work in February 2001. That
removal was affirmed at the highest levels of Andersen's manage-
ment.41 Other Andersen accountants faced similar treatment includ-
ing Jennifer Stevenson and Pattie Grutzmacher, both of whom were
removed from certain Enron work after they took positions adverse
to their client's desires. 42
At least sometimes, when the aggressive strategy of pressing for
favorable accounting treatment did not work with the PSG, Enron
and its Andersen engagement team advocates appeared simply to
ignore PSG advice. Over time, Enron became increasingly fond of
establishing hypothetically independent partnerships to remove
various risky ventures from its own books. There are myriad rules
regulating the ownership and use of such "special purpose entities."
One of these rules requires that each such entity, set up to stand on its
37. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 458, at *41 (government closing argument).
38. Anita Raghavan, Accountable: How a Bright Star At Andersen Fell Along With Enron,
WALL ST. J., May 15, 2002, at Al.
39. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 448, at *18 (testimony of
Benjamin Neuhausen, Andersen Professional Standards Group Partner).
40. Id, 2002 Extra LEXIS 448, at *18-*19.
41. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 461, at *159-*72 (testimony of Richard Corgel, Andersen
Practice Director for North America ).
42. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 464, at *52 (testimony of
Jennifer Stevenson, Andersen Enron Engagement Experienced Manager).
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own, must be evaluated independently with respect to the reporting
of profit and loss. 43 Enron set up a number of special purpose entities
jointly referred to as the "Raptor" partnerships. Several of these
businesses experienced reversals that resulted in substantial losses.
To hide these losses and, perhaps, the whole Raptor apparatus from
public scrutiny, Enron sought to meld together the profits and losses
from all the separate Raptor entities (the net result of this aggrega-
tion was a profit).
The PSG was asked to determine whether such a consolidation
was permissible. It decided that aggregation would violate the special
purpose entity rules unless steps were taken to bind the separate
entities into a single unit.44 Duncan, the senior members of the
Andersen engagement team, and their Enron counterparts more or
less ignored that determination and aggregated the various Raptors'
profits and losses. This aggregation occurred despite virtually unani-
mous agreement within Arthur Andersen that PSG advice should
never be ignored and, generally, should be determinative. 4
The Raptor problem, along with difficulties affecting other spe-
cial purpose entities (among them Jedi, Chewco, and a number of
others) continued to grow. By August 2001, Sheron Watkins, an
Arthur Andersen alumna who had joined Enron, concluded that
problems with these entities were so serious that they threatened the
well-being of the company. She contacted Andersen's James Hecker,
with whom she had previously worked, and told him of her concerns.4 6
Watkins's disclosures confronted Andersen with a serious problem.
Andersen's position as independent auditor made it incumbent upon
the firm to see that Enron took appropriate steps to address Wat-
kins's claims. If Enron did not act, Andersen was required to notify
Enron's board of directors and perhaps even the SEC. Andersen was
then facing deep trouble in an Arizona case because it had failed to
follow up on similar "whistle-blower" charges.47 Watkins, at least in
part, solved Andersen's dilemma by taking her charges directly to
43. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 448, at *22-*28 (testimony of Benjamin Neuhausen).
44. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 448, at *204-*10 (testimony of
Carl Bass, Anderson Professional Standards Group Partner).
45. E.g., id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 448, at *7-*10 (testimony of Benjamin Neuhausen); id. 2002
Extra LEXIS 457, at *215-*17 (testimony of John Riley, Andersen Practice Director/SEC
Specialist Partner).
46. Id. Extra LEXIS 450, at *196-*98 (testimony of James Hecker).
47. Brady, supra note 12, at C3.
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Enron's CEO, Kenneth Lay. Enron then asked one of its principal
law firms, Vinson & Elkins, to investigate the matter.
Watkins's communication was not the only information Ander-
sen received suggesting that all was not well at Enron. In late August
2001, Andersen's auditors discovered an equity accounting error of
more than $1 billion.48 This error did not directly affect profits, but it
did shrink the shareholders' stake in the company. Press interest in
Enron's accounting began to intensify at about the same time. On
August 27, the Wall Street Journal published the first of its pieces
regarding the company's questionable bookkeeping practices. This
prompted the Fort Worth branch of the SEC to open an informal
investigation of Enron.
Within the upper reaches of Andersen's management, concern
was beginning to grow about the Enron engagement. In the latter
part of September, highly placed Andersen partners held a telephone
conference to consider the Raptor problem.49 Shortly thereafter,
members of the PSG learned for the first time that the Enron en-
gagement team had ignored their advice on Raptor aggregation. At
the same time, memoranda written by the engagement team came to
light in which PSG members were erroneously said to have reviewed
and endorsed positions that were now under serious scrutiny. 0 All of
this suggested a rapidly growing crisis, not only for Enron, but also for
Andersen. On September 28, Nancy Temple, a Harvard-trained
litigator and relatively new Andersen partner, was assigned to pro-
vide legal assistance on the growing list of problems. Amy Ripepi,
then the head of the PSG, would later testify that the assignment of a
fairly junior lawyer-partner to participate in such high-level discus-
sions was unusual.1 On October 8, Temple engaged outside counsel
to help her. The firm she selected was Davis Polk, an elite New York
law firm with a reputation for expertise in representing those accused
of white-collar crime and in handling accounting firm problems. One
day later, Temple remarked in her notes that it was "[h]ighly prob-
able some SEC investigation [would be forthcoming]. '5 2 At the same
time, she noted the possibility that Enron might be compelled to issue
48. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 467, at *101 (testimony of
David Duncan).
49. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 448, at *39 (testimony of Benjamin Neuhausen).
50. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 466, at *7-*9 (testimony of Carl Bass).
51. Id. at *155 (testimony of Amy Ripepi, Andersen Professional Standards Group Head
and Partner).
52. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 459, at *70-*71 (testimony of FBI Agent Sullivan).
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a restatement of recent financial disclosures- a move also likely to
pique SEC interest. Finally, in her October 9 notes, she voiced
concern that the engagement team's rejection of PSG advice might
expose Andersen to accusations that it had violated the "cease and
desist order in Waste Management"5 3 regarding Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
From this point on, suspicious conduct seemed to grow with each
step Arthur Andersen took. On October 12, Temple sent Michael
Odom, a key member of the Enron engagement team, the following
e-mail: "Mike, it might be useful to consider reminding the engage-
ment team of our documentation and retention policy. It will be
helpful to make sure that we have complied with the policy. Let me
know if you have any questions. Nancy. 5 4 The objective of the
policy was to require the destruction of all but core accounting work
papers.5 5 Temple would continue for the next four weeks to remind
various Andersen accountants about the policy and the need to
comply. Those she told included members of the PSG as well as
accountants who had worked on the Enron account. Her admonition
was repeated by the leaders of the Enron engagement team including
Duncan, who at two meetings on October 23 reminded people of the
protocols previously highlighted by Temple. The message was
eventually spread from Houston (where Enron was headquartered)
and Chicago (where the PSG was situated) to London, England, and
Portland, Oregon, where others who had worked on Enron matters
were located.5 6
This document destruction effort in the midst of a growing ac-
counting crisis was unprecedented. An SEC official testified at trial
that he had never heard of a "big five" accounting firm doing such a
thing. 7 At least three members of the PSG testified that they had
never before received such instructions. 8 Duncan stated during his
testimony that he had never before received or given such a direc-
53. Id.
54. Id. at *81-*82.
55. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 448, at *52-*54 (testimony of Benjamin Neuhausen); id. 2002
Extra LEXIS 467, at *144-*45 (testimony of David Duncan).
56. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 464, at *184-*90 (testimony of Shane Philpott, experienced
Portland manager).
57. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 450, at *45 (testimony of
Thomas Newkirk).
58. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 448, at *57 (testimony of Benjamin Neuhausen); id. 2002 Extra
LEXIS 466, at *14 (testimony of Carl Bass); id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 469, at *86 (testimony of
Amy Ripepi).
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tive.5 9 In Portland, Andersen accountants were so surprised by the
"reminder" that the leaders of the office (to their great credit) held
internal discussions during which they decided not to destroy any
Enron-related material. They then instructed the young accountants
under their supervision to preserve everything in their files.60
As the document destruction "reminder" circulated, events were
taking place that signaled the impending rupture of the En-
ron/Andersen relationship. October 16, 2001 was the day on which
Enron was scheduled to announce publicly its quarterly earnings.
Shortly before that date, Enron officials provided Andersen with the
proposed text of the announcement. Andersen's accountants noted
that Enron was reporting large losses related to the operations of its
special purpose entities but describing them as "non-recurring." This
accounting classification was viewed by the Andersen team as mis-
leading because the losses were precisely the sort any business might
suffer during normal operations. 61 Duncan was dispatched to warn
Enron that it risked an SEC challenge if it persisted in using the term
"non-recurring. ' 62  Despite Duncan's warning, Enron issued its
quarterly earnings statement with the objectionable language.
Furthermore, Enron's statement made no reference to the $1 billion
equity problem Andersen auditors had uncovered in August. By
ignoring Andersen's input, Enron seemed to be moving away from a
cooperative relationship with its auditor. Duncan's failure to per-
suade Enron to change course was viewed within Andersen as a sign
that his effectiveness had been undermined and that others would be
needed to deal with the growing Enron crisis.61
Duncan drafted a memorandum to memorialize his dealings with
Enron regarding the October 16 earnings statement. In his draft he
indicated that Andersen had determined that the use of the term
"non-recurring" was "misleading" and that he had so informed
Enron's Richard Causey.64 This draft was routed to Temple and a
number of others for review. She advised Duncan to cut the word
"misleading," apparently fearing that such a designation would
impose a responsibility on Andersen to report Enron's conduct to the
59. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 467, at *146 (testimony of David Duncan).
60. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 464, at *184-*90 (testimony of Shane Philpott).
61. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 448, at *43-*47 (testimony of Benjamin Neuhausen).
62. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 467, at *71-*73 (testimony of David Duncan).
63. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 457, at *228-*30 (testimony of John Riley).
64. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 467, at *71-*73 (testimony of David Duncan).
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SEC.65 She also requested that Duncan remove from the memoran-
dum any indication that it had been routed to her or other members
of Andersen's legal department.
By October 17, the day after the issuance of the quarterly earn-
ings statement, all hell was breaking loose at Enron. Its acknowl-
edgment of large losses in esoteric special purpose entities set off
alarm bells in the stock market, and the Wall Street Journal wrote its
second article decrying the apparent financial irregularities at the
company.66 On that same day, Vinson & Elkins's report on Sheron
Watkins's accusations was released. At trial, David Stulb, a highly
skilled and exceptionally candid Andersen forensic accountant, would
describe their report as a "white-wash. ' 67 It is a fair guess that he was
not alone in recognizing the problems with the report. Enron's stock
began a free fall in which it lost 55% of its value within ten days.
Andersen turned from trying to work with its client to trying to
save itself. On October 19, Andersen held the first of a series of
conference calls to consider what course of action to pursue. The
next day, Andersen's leadership participated in a highly unusual
weekend conference call focused on the developing problem. 68 On
October 23, the Andersen engagement team anxiously tuned into a
webcast by Kenneth Lay, Enron's CEO, in which he sought to answer
stock market analysts' questions about Enron. In Duncan's estimate,
that interview was a disaster. 69 Lay acknowledged problems with
"lawsuits, potential lawsuits, as well as the SEC inquiry."70 On the
heels of the webcast, Duncan immediately convened a meeting of his
engagement team staff. At that meeting he directed his team to make
effectuation of the document destruction policy a high priority. In his
testimony at trial, Duncan said he was motivated to give what
amounted to an order to shred documents because of "[t]he losses
recorded in the quarter, the escalating news reports, the lawsuits and
the potential for further lawsuits[,] and the SEC inquiry."'" In es-
sence, he admitted that he was encouraging the destruction of evi-
dence that might be used against Arthur Andersen. This suggests a
cool, clear-eyed decision to destroy potentially damaging evidence.
65. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 459, at *92-*93 (government document presentation).
66. Id. at *102-*04.
67. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 455, at *213 (testimony of David Stulb).
68. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 467, at *119-*27 (testimony of David Duncan).
69. Id. at *139-'41.
70. Id. at *142.
71. Id. at *144.
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In reality, it appeared that Duncan had panicked when his high-flying
Enron-based world began to disintegrate. David Stulb would testify
at trial that when he met Duncan a few days after these events, what
he saw was a man so overcome by his anxieties that he was "like a
deer caught in the headlights.7 2
Shredding began in earnest at Andersen on October 24. Most of
those who were given the document policy "reminder" took it as a
directive to destroy Enron-related (and only Enron-related) materi-
als.73 This was true of PSG members in Chicago, as well as engage-
ment team members in Houston and former team members in
London. Only in Portland did highly placed Andersen accountants
consider the negative implications of document destruction and direct
the preservation of records. Elsewhere, the shredders and delete
buttons worked overtime. Previously, there had never been a day in
Houston when Arthur Andersen shredded more than 900 pounds of
documents. However, on October 24, 925 pounds of documents were
shredded. The next day (October 25) the total was an astounding
2,380 pounds. The day after that another 520 pounds were de-
stroyed.7 4 For the first time in anyone's memory, the independent
shredding-service used by Andersen was called twice in the same
week.75 During this period deletions of e-mails occurred at three
times the normal rate.76
John Riley, a key Andersen troubleshooter with an SEC back-
ground and experience in both the Waste Management and Sunbeam
cases, was sent to Houston on October 25. After he thought he heard
shredders in action, he warned Duncan about the foolishness of
document destruction.77 Duncan stonewalled Riley, denying that any
shredding was taking place and keeping him away from critical
meetings with Enron officials. 78 Riley reported his difficulties with
Duncan to Andersen leaders, and by October 29 most of the top brass
of Andersen had gathered in Houston, apparently to take charge.
However, shredding and deletion continued. On October 30, the
72. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 463, at *96-*97 (testimony of David Stulb).
73. E.g., id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 448, at *63 (testimony of Benjamin Neuhausen); id. 2002
Extra LEXIS 469, at *152-*54 (testimony of James Green, Andersen Professional Standards
Group Partner).
74. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 460, at *109-11 (testimony of FBI Agent Paula Schanzle).
75. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 463, at *207-*08 (testimony of Sharon Thibaut, Andersen
Records Department Supervisor).
76. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 460, at *113 (testimony of FBI Agent Schanzle).
77. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 457, at *134 (testimony of John Riley).
78. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 465, at *124-*27 (testimony of John Riley).
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SEC informed Enron of its opening of a formal investigation. At
about the same time, Andersen auditors concluded that Enron would
have to restate publicly its equity accounting because of the $1 billion
error that had been discovered in August.7 9 The consequence of this
restatement was redoubled SEC and media scrutiny of both Enron
and Andersen. No steps were taken to preserve Andersen documents
until November 9, the day after Enron issued its restatement. On that
date, a blunt e-mail was posted that commanded: "No more shred-
ding."80
The story of October and early November seemed incredibly
damning to Arthur Andersen. Duncan would eventually admit that
he used Andersen's document destruction policy in an effort to
obstruct justice, not only on his own, but on his firm's behalf. Other
Andersen players including Temple and Tom Bauer (another en-
gagement partner on the Enron account) would not make such open
admissions but would invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege to
remain silent rather than to testify at Andersen's trial. An air of the
deepest suspicion hung over the case.
II. THE JURY SCRUTINIZES THE CASE
The jury impaneled in the Andersen case was comprised of nine
men and three women. It included a university professor, an airline
executive, a pastry chef, a Baptist minister, a banker, an artist, a
jeweler, a security guard, an accountant, and several manufacturing or
warehouse workers. 81 Its composition did not seem remarkable
except, perhaps, for the fact that a majority of its members were
drawn from minority groups (either Latino or African-American).
According to the Houston Chronicle, when the jurors took their first
vote they were, despite the torrent of suspicious facts, evenly divided
six-to-six. After more than fifty hours of deliberations spread out
over seven days, the jury had shifted to nine in favor of conviction
and three opposed. 82 There the jury stalled. At the end of the
seventh day of deliberations (after more than fifty-six hours), the jury
79. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 467, at *184-*86 (testimony of David Duncan).
80. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 459, at *218-19.
81. Mary Flood, The Andersen Verdict, Decision By Jurors Hinged on Memo, HOUS.
CHRON., June 16, 2002, at Al.
82. Id.
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sent Judge Harmon a note stating: "We are not able to reach a
unanimous verdict. '83
In response to the jury's note, the judge decided to instruct them
with the so-called "dynamite charge," first used in Allen v. United
States84 This charge urges jurors to put aside their disagreements and
come to a verdict. The charge got its nickname because of its fre-
quent success in exploding the resistance of holdout jurors. After the
judge's instruction, the jury went back to work. Over three tortuous
days the jury slowly moved forward, finally reaching an eleven-to-one
vote.85 The lone holdout was the jury's foreman, university professor
Oscar Criner. He said he was skeptical about much of the govern-
ment's case (especially regarding Duncan) and wanted to believe that
people at Andersen had stood up to Enron. Eventually, however,
Criner and his fellow jurors came to concentrate on the actions and
words of Nancy Temple. All twelve finally agreed that by editing
Duncan's October 16 memorandum, so that it made no reference to
the misrepresentations contained in Enron's earnings statement,
Temple had destroyed critical material in an effort to obstruct justice
on Arthur Andersen's behalf. After seventy-two hours of debate
over ten days, the jury found a basis on which its twelve members
could agree to convict. It was not, however, the one primarily pressed
by the government. All this suggests that the Andersen case was
anything but a slam-dunk.
III. WHY THE ARTHUR ANDERSEN CASE WAS So DIFFICULT-THE
DYNAMICS OF JURY TRIAL IN AMERICA
Those who suggested that the Andersen prosecution would result
in a swift and easy victory for the government failed to consider a
number of factors that can dramatically affect jury evaluation of high-
profile criminal trials including witness credibility, sympathy with an
"underdog" defendant, reluctance to vote for an ultimate penalty
(one that results in an execution or the disbanding of an organiza-
tion), and sensitivity to powerful advocacy on behalf of the accused
party. In the Andersen trial, all four of these factors were at work and
made conviction far more difficult.
83. Tom Fowler et al., Judge Puts Fire Under Jury, Urges End to Andersen Deadlock,
HOUS. CHRON., June 13, 2002, at Al.
84. 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
85. My description of the forging of the verdict is drawn from Flood, supra note 81, at Al.
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Traditionally, one of the primary functions of the jury has been
to assess witness credibility. Juries are instructed that this is their
exclusive province, and criminal defense lawyers often construct their
cases around an assault on prosecution witnesses' credibility. In the
Andersen case, credibility was an important issue. David Duncan, the
man who served as the government's star witness, presented a num-
ber of credibility questions for the jury. Duncan did not appear to be
the sort of man who would intentionally destroy evidence or conspire
to thwart a government investigation. He was highly regarded both at
work and in his community.8 6 His on-the-stand claim to have orches-
trated a scheme to obstruct justice did not ring entirely true. As the
Houston Chronicle put it: "[H]e 'mouthed the words' the government
wanted at the same time his demeanor said the opposite. 's7
Duncan had strong incentive to say whatever the government de-
sired. He had entered the standard sort of plea agreement pursuant
to which, in exchange for his guilty plea to an obstruction of justice
charge and his testimonial cooperation, he was promised protection
from other Enron-related charges as well as the possibility of leniency
in sentencing.88 What this meant, as defense counsel Rusty Hardin
was quick to point out, was that Duncan received protection from
charges like fraud that might have carried a far longer sentence. 9 It
also meant that if the government were satisfied, it could choose to
submit a letter to the sentencing judge that might have the effect of
securing Duncan probation rather than incarceration. 90
Duncan had other reasons to seek to curry favor by testifying on
behalf of the government. First, he had young children and a clearly
expressed desire to avoid jail in order to help care for them. 91 Second,
the target of his testimony, Arthur Andersen, had given him grounds
to be resentful. The firm which had lionized him as a budding super-
star a few short months earlier had decided on January 15, 2002 to
blame him for everything and terminate his employment. During his
cross-examination, Duncan admitted that he felt "unfairly treated" by
86. See Raghavan, supra note 38, at A8.
87. Mary Flood, U.S. Case Against Andersen Strong, But Legal Game is Tight, Hous.
CHRON., May 27, 2002, at Al.
88. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 462, at *136-*40 (testimony of
David Duncan).
89. Id. at *138.
90. Id. at *148-*49.
91. Id. at *140.
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Andersen.92 Hardin insinuated that both Duncan's personal lawyers
and the government used these considerations improperly to manipu-
late the witness into accepting both his and Arthur Andersen's guilt-
something he had vigorously denied until his plea deal. There were
ample grounds for sympathetic jurors to accept Judge Harmon's
instruction to scrutinize Duncan's testimony "with great care" and
discount it because of the witness's "interest."9 3 In the end, if one
believes what certain jurors told the Houston Chronicle, Duncan's
testimony was disregarded as the basis for conviction.94
The Government confronted a different sort of credibility prob-
lem with respect to other Andersen witnesses, a group that formed
the core of the prosecution's case (eight of its fifteen witnesses) and
the totality of the defendant's presentation (all twelve of its wit-
nesses). Arthur Andersen was an elite accounting firm-one of the
"big five" that dominated the industry. Accountants associated with
Andersen generally felt proud of their work and of the firm. Not only
did Andersen accountants enjoy high status and self-esteem, but they
made very handsome livings as employees of one of the most success-
ful professional services firms in America. There was little likelihood
that many of them would be predisposed to attack the firm.
Two of the prosecution's early witnesses illustrated the govern-
ment's dilemma. James Hecker, the man contacted by Sheron
Watkins, was a partner in the Houston office. He was something of a
maverick and a wit. Five years before Enron's collapse, he had
penned a satirical song about the company using the tune from the
Eagles' hit song "Hotel California." In his ditty he described Enron
as an aggressive client that manipulated accountants to maximize
business advantage. Despite Watkins's charges and the events of
2001, Hecker resisted any suggestion that his Enron satire was
grounded in or reflected reality. Hecker insisted that Andersen's
accountants had worked hard and, generally, successfully "to keep
[Enron] ... within the line." 95 This was hardly the stuff to convince a
jury that Enron had destroyed Andersen's independence or produced
auditors willing to commit felonies.
92. Id. at *102
93. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 458, at *18-*21 (Judge Harmon's charge to the jury).
94. Flood, supra note 81, at Al.
95. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 450, at *214 (testimony of
James Hecker).
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The government also hoped to demonstrate Enron's corrupting
influence on Andersen when it called PSG head, Amy Ripepi, to the
stand. She, however, resisted. She even declined to criticize Enron,
refusing to agree that the company's October 2001 quarterly earnings
statement was misleading. Nor would she concede that in October
2001, accountants at Andersen expected an SEC investigation. (This
point was critical to the prosecution. If Andersen employees had
recognized a likelihood of investigation, any destruction of docu-
ments in mid-October or later could be far more readily categorized
as obstruction of justice.)96 Her direct examination was manifestly
unsatisfactory to the government. The prosecution's problem was
compounded when Ripepi responded sympathetically to Rusty
Hardin's cross-examination on behalf of Andersen. The government
was so incensed with her performance that it took the highly unusual
step of attempting on redirect examination to attack her credibility.
In justifying that move prosecutor Samuel Buell said: "Mr. Hardin
spent a couple of hours with this witness on Friday. I can only
characterize it as she was skipping down the garden path with him.
And I'm entitled to bring out bias. I'm entitled to impeach this
witness now." 97 The government impeached Ripepi by pointing out
that Andersen paid her approximately $750,000 a year (giving her a
significant stake in its survival). It also confronted her with a number
of her inconsistent prior statements. To all this, the government
added a not too subtle attack on Andersen itself by reminding Ripepi
of the Waste Management and Sunbeam scandals-black marks on
her firm's record.
The government suffered the Hecker and Ripepi problems on
the third and fourth days of its case-in-chief. Such problems signaled
just how difficult it would be for the prosecutors to convict Arthur
Andersen out of the mouths of Andersen employees. In apparent
reaction to these experiences, the government steered clear of a
number of important Andersen employee witnesses later in the trial,
including the most prominent and esteemed member of the PSG
(John Stewart) and the upright Portland accountants who had prohib-
ited document destruction in their office (Shane Philpot, Timothy
McCann, and Richard McCune). In the end, Andersen employees'
allegiance to their firm seriously weakened the prosecution's case.
The government had started out as if Andersen was a typical criminal
96. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Andersen Fiasco, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 11, 2002, at A19.
97. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 469, at *50 (testimony of Amy Ripepi).
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organization like a Mafia "family" or a drug gang. Prosecutors
appeared to expect witnesses to be ready to attack Andersen or, at
least, distance themselves from it. Instead, they found deep and
abiding loyalty to what had been, for decades, a pillar of the account-
ing industry. Andersen witnesses' attitudes forced the government to
look for alternative ways to convince the jury of the firm's guilt-a
difficult problem in a case where the actions of insiders on behalf of
the firm were the central issue.
As the trial progressed, jurors seemed, more and more, to see
Andersen as the "underdog" and accord it sympathy on that basis.
At first blush, it might seem ridiculous to suggest that one of the "big
five" accounting firms could come to be regarded as an underdog, but
events both outside and inside the courtroom seemed to move things
in that direction. From almost everyone's perspective, it was not
Andersen but Enron that was the real villain. Enron was the propo-
nent of aggressive accounting practices and the preparer of mislead-
ing financial statements. Enron lied not only to the market and the
public but also to Arthur Andersen as well. In particular, the evi-
dence suggested that Enron's officials had lied to or withheld infor-
mation from its auditors about a number of the special purpose
entities that had done so much to undermine the energy trader. The
true ownership of these entities was kept hidden as was the fact that
they were, in a number of cases, little more than instruments for self-
dealing by highly placed Enron officers like CFO Andrew Fastow.98
Placing the blame on Andersen for Enron's collapse might easily be
seen as scapegoating, especially in light of all of Enron's chicanery.
(It should be noted, however, that Enron's misconduct did little to
justify Andersen's own very real and serious negligence.)
The scapegoat theme and other considerations appeared to gar-
ner Andersen a good deal of public support. As the Houston Chroni-
cle said of the proceedings, Andersen "had more than a small
measure of public sympathy." 99 Juror receptivity to Andersen's plight
was perhaps enhanced by the fact that a majority of the jurors were
minority group members likely to be particularly sensitive to the
interests of underdogs and naturally suspicious of schemes to shift
blame away from wealthy and powerful wrongdoers. This sympathy
98. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 466, at *1-*4 (testimony of Carl Bass); id. 2002 Extra LEXIS
462, at *41-*42 (testimony of David Duncan); id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 469, at *105 (testimony of
Amy Ripepi).
99. Ivanovich & Brewer, supra note 1, at Al.
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was, in all likelihood, heightened by the constant media focus on
Andersen. At some point, negative publicity can boomerang and
generate concern for a targeted individual, as appeared to be the case
with respect to President Clinton during the Lewinsky affair. More-
over, as Arthur Andersen's options dwindled and clients fled the
accounting firm in droves, a feeling of sympathy for the thousands of
innocent Andersen employees was likely to have been kindled.
Courtroom events also seemed to foster a shift in sympathies to
Andersen. The government, under incredible pressure to win the
case or suffer a substantial legal and political setback in its Enron
investigation, proceeded with the grimmest sort of resolve. It turned
James Hecker's light-hearted parody into a jeremiad. Rusty Hardin
was quick to point out the government's heavy-handedness and to
argue, in popular parlance, that the government's lawyers "need[ed]
to get a life." 10 Even more provocative was the government's re-
peated references to Andersen's prior wrongdoing in the Waste
Management and Sunbeam cases. This matter will be explored in
some detail below, but here it should be noted that the government's
repeated references to prior wrongdoing gave the appearance of an
effort at character assassination-a ploy that can, at least sometimes,
backfire.
Judge Harmon and Rusty Hardin clashed repeatedly during the
trial. While such disputes can turn jurors against what may be per-
ceived as an obstreperous or disrespectful lawyer, in the Andersen
case they seemed to underscore the embattled circumstances in which
Arthur Andersen found itself. On the second day of the trial, Hardin
complained (with some justification): "Judge, you haven't sustained a
single objection of mine yet."""1 A few days later he suggested that
the judge's rulings were "about 185 to 3."' 2 Hardin confronted the
judge repeatedly claiming that she applied a different, more lenient
standard of evaluation to the government's arguments. Despite a
number of dubious sallies, there was something to Hardin's charge,
and jurors could easily find this an additional reason to be sympa-
thetic to Arthur Andersen as an underdog.
The Andersen prosecution was also made more difficult by the
fact that conviction would be the functional equivalent of a death
100. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 458, at *245 (defense closing
argument).
101. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 454, at *253 (testimony of Thomas Newkirk).
102. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 469, at *167 (testimony of James Green).
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sentence for the accounting firm. This was so because the SEC has a
rule requiring the debarment of any accounting firm convicted of a
felony from serving as the auditor of a publicly traded corporation.10 3
Since that was the core of Andersen's business, its conviction would
mean the demise of the firm, a fact acknowledged by the prosecution
in its closing argument. 104 It has long been recognized that significant
segments of the population are profoundly uneasy about the imposi-
tion of a death sentence. Concern about this has led many states to
adopt procedures designed to exclude potential jurors who are
unalterably opposed to the ultimate penalty. 105 While the identity of
those who would object to the execution of a defendant might be very
different from those who would protest the dismantling of a business
entity, the same sorts of concerns-about the draconian nature of the
punishment, the inevitable risk of mistake, and the likelihood of
disparities in treatment-would seem to be present. It is reasonable
to assume that jurors confronted with the destruction of a huge firm
and the consequent loss of jobs by thousands of innocent employees
would be reluctant to convict.
Even before the trial began, Rusty Hardin was hard at work try-
ing to frame the proceedings as a life and death matter. At a hearing
on March 20 in which the defense sought the earliest possible trial
date, Hardin repeatedly emphasized the extremity of the danger to
Andersen. He told the court that Arthur Andersen was "a company
whose very existence is in jeopardy," 1°6 and supported his accelerated
scheduling request by arguing "if you're going to put 28,000 people
out of work, there ought to be some fundamental fairness attached to
it."107 He reminded the court that his client was "totally at risk" 1° and
succeeded in convincing the judge to set a dramatically expedited trial
schedule. Recognizing the power of the death penalty argument, the
government made a motion in limine to prevent the defense from
making such an appeal to the jury. What the government specifically
sought to bar was the eliciting of "information about the effect of this
103. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(2) (2002) (SEC Rule of Practice mandating suspension of right
to appear or practice before the SEC upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude).
104. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 458, at *154 (government
closing argument).
105. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
106. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 447, at *17 (pretrial hearing).
107. Id. at *20.
108. Id. at *30.
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indictment and this case on Andersen and its personnel." 10 9 The court
granted the government's motion.
Throughout the trial, Hardin, in subtle and not so subtle ways,
sought to remind the jury of the stakes involved. In his opening, he
described Arthur Andersen as "a proud firm of 28,000 employees"
that was "90 years of age." 110 He reiterated the same numbers in his
cross-examination of the government's first witness, SEC Division of
Enforcement Associate Director Thomas Newkirk. He went even
further with Newkirk by questioning him about the history of SEC
debarment of accounting firms, which Hardin described as "the
ultimate penalty."11' He eventually pursued this theme so vigorously
with Newkirk and later witnesses that the government sought sanc-
tions against him for breaching the limitations fixed by the motion in
limine.12
As part of his strategy, Hardin relied on arguments often used in
death penalty cases, that (in Eighth Amendment terms) the punish-
ment proposed was cruel and unusual."3 As Hardin described it, the
cruelty was to the thousands of innocent Andersen employees who
would lose their jobs if the firm were convicted, an argument made
more poignant since the acts in question in the case had been carried
out by a mere handful of Andersen partners. The unusualness
Hardin focused on was twofold. First, he pointed out that on three
other occasions "big five" firms had faced disciplinary proceedings
before the SEC for "improper professional practice" and that in none
of these cases had there been a debarment.114 Second, he elicited
testimony that although there were dozens of financial restatements
each year, virtually none ever led to charges against an auditing firm,
let alone the termination of its practice."5
As in death penalty cases, Hardin strove to "humanize" his cli-
ent. He made a special effort to place young, attractive Andersen
employees on the stand. One was Emily Madison, a young account-
ant who had a child a brief ten weeks before the trial. Others in-
109. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 463, at *142 (government motion to enforce motion in limine).
110. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 454, at *64 (defense opening statement).
111. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 450, at *11 (testimony of Thomas Newkirk).
112. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 463, at *142-*45 (government motion to enforce motion in
limine).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
114. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 454, at *237-*38 (testimony of
Thomas Newkirk).
115. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 450, at *20 (testimony of Thomas Newkirk).
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cluded Shane Philpott and Timothy McCann, who had led the Port-
land opposition to shredding. Hardin also called Jennifer Stevenson
who, with her colleague, Pattie Grutzmacher, had resisted Enron
demands and had been removed from some of its work. All these
witnesses served an analogous role to those called by a defendant in
the penalty phase of a death case. They displayed the defendant's
good characteristics as well as contributions to family and community.
Hardin closed his case as he had opened it, with a reminder to
the jury that Arthur Andersen was a ninety-year-old firm with 28,000
employees. 16 He emphasized the "incredible impact [of conviction]
on such a company whose integrity is everything."'"17 He warned the
jurors not to "rush to judgment" because a conviction would mean
the ruin of a 28,000-person firm.""
Hardin did not rely exclusively on the emotional appeal of the
"underdog" and death penalty arguments. He challenged much of
the testimony that raised suspicions about Andersen's conduct
between mid-September and early November 2001. One of his tactics
was to attempt to shift the focus of suspicion from Arthur Andersen
to others who might be held responsible. His most promising target
was, of course, Enron. He sketched Enron's lies and misconduct with
a number of witnesses. He particularly underscored the improvi-
dence of Enron's board of directors-a body that had approved
Andrew Fastow's pocket-lining schemes. 119 He also attempted to
assign blame for Enron's collapse to the SEC. With the second of the
two SEC witnesses offered by the prosecution, defense counsel
sought to suggest that the government's oversight of Enron was
inadequate and that the SEC had fiddled "while Rome burned."'120
Duncan, too, came in for his share of blame. Hardin, however,
was gentler with Duncan, suggesting that Duncan's key mistake had
been breaching Andersen's cardinal rule that decisions be collegial
and made after full consultations. The consultation theme was one he
sounded with at least three Andersen witnesses, 2' and it was cun-
116. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 458, at *171 (Defendant's closing argument).
117. Id. at *200.
118. Id. at *335.
119. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 448, at *128 (testimony of Benjamin Neuhausen).
120. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 450, at *183 (testimony of Spenser Barasch, SEC Associate
District Administrator for Ft. Worth Office).
121. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 455, at *21, *113-*14 (government document presentation); id.
2002 Extra LEXIS 461, at *112-13 (testimony of Richard Corgel); id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 452, at
*13 (testimony of Emily Madison, Andersen Houston Partner).
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ningly designed to suggest that while Duncan had erred, Andersen
had not. As a follow up, Hardin appeared to suggest that having
failed to get the input of his partners, Duncan panicked and made bad
choices that landed him in serious trouble.
Another of Hardin's strategies with respect to suspicious events
was to ask the jury to reassess them in light of clarifying or qualifying
information. Three of the most suspicious incidents in the govern-
ment's proof were: (1) Arthur Andersen's removal of Carl Bass from
Enron PSG work; (2) the Houston engagement team's rejection of
PSG advice about Raptor aggregation; and (3) the massive shredding
that began in earnest on October 24 and did not stop until November
9. As to the first of these, Hardin proffered a number of points. He
questioned Duncan about Bass. The engagement team leader
described the PSG member as temperamental, negative, and stub-
born.122 Moreover, Duncan testified that Bass had caused Enron
substantial embarrassment and expense with respect to a transaction
(the so-called Blockbuster deal) on which he had worked.23 Beyond
pursuing Bass's idiosyncrasies, Hardin sought to emphasize that
Bass's removal from Enron matters had no significant effect on
Andersen policy because those who remained on the PSG, most
particularly the distinguished John Stewart, held similar views and
insisted on adherence to sound accounting principles. Hardin
stressed the continuing integrity of the PSG and its apparently
unabated commitment to getting the accounting right.
Accreditation of the PSG, however, presented Hardin with a di-
lemma because the engagement team led by Duncan had, at a critical
juncture, ignored the PSG's advice and aggregated the accounts of
the various Raptor entities. Moreover, engagement team members
had prepared memoranda that erroneously suggested that the PSG
had endorsed the engagement team's approach. These problems
were hard ones to resolve. What Hardin decided to do was to try to
get Carl Bass to agree that Duncan and his team had not acted with
improper intent. Bass more or less obliged, testifying (perhaps in
another example of an Andersen employee not wishing to disparage
the firm) that the Enron engagement team had done nothing fraudu-
lent in its Raptor work but had simply disagreed with the PSG on a
question of accounting."2 4 As to the misleading ascriptions in the
122. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 462, at *198-*99 (testimony of David Duncan).
123. Id. at *218.
124. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 466, at *38 (testimony of Carl Bass).
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memos, Bass viewed these as simply "an honest mistake" that had
been corrected when discovered. 125 In his examination of Duncan,
Hardin reinforced these points, getting Duncan to state that he felt
there was no absolute obligation to conform to the PSG's view and
that he had done what he thought was proper at the time. 2 6 Hardin
went further, getting Duncan to testify that there were occasions
when the SEC had taken a more liberal approach to an accounting
problem than had the PSG.127
The shredding question was by far the most difficult for Ander-
sen to handle. The facts regarding the massive shredding carried out
from October 24 to November 9 at the apparent suggestion of several
Andersen partners were extremely troubling. Hardin tried a number
of different approaches in response. He suggested that the shredding
was not nearly so massive as the government contended. He argued
that a great deal of what was destroyed had nothing to do with Enron.
Hardin pointed out that multiple copies of most documents existed
and that there had been no thoroughgoing effort to get rid of all of
them. Many of those who had deleted materials, including Carl Bass
and Benjamin Neuhausen of the PSG, testified that they had no
intention of hiding anything from anyone when they destroyed
documents or deleted e-mails. 128 Key Andersen leaders including
Amy Ripepi, who headed the PSG, and Richard Corgel, who was
Practice Director for all of North America, denied that Andersen
believed any SEC document request was imminent.129 If they were to
be believed then no documents were destroyed with the intention of
depriving the SEC of access to them. Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, Hardin led a number of witnesses to testify that ac-
countants were not supposed to make determinations about docu-
ment retention in cases of investigation or litigation. That was a job
for lawyers. Neuhausen so stated 3 ° and Bass agreed, testifying that
he would not know about litigation, "[s]omeone would have to tell
me. Someone with competent legal experience.' 3' Emily Madison
125. Id. at *57.
126. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 462, at *63-*64 (testimony of David Duncan).
127. Id. at *214.
128. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 448, at *115-*16 (testimony of Benjamin Neuhausen); id. 2002
Extra LEXIS 466, at *102-*03 (testimony of Carl Bass).
129. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 466, at *233 (testimony of Amy Ripepi); id. 2002 Extra LEXIS
461, at *159-*60 (testimony of Richard Corgel).
130. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 448, at *110 (testimony of Benjamin Neuhausen).
131. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 466, at *103 (testimony of Carl Bass).
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said the same thing,132 and John Riley, one of Andersen's SEC
experts, stated that it was up to "the attorneys who were working with
us on these types of matters [to] let us know.' 1 33
The argument asserting lawyers' responsibility for deciding when
litigation or investigation is likely and what documents should,
therefore, be preserved, had genuine appeal. It was logical and had
the effect of substantially diminishing Andersen's accountants'
responsibility for document destruction or retention decisions. It did,
however, have one serious negative consequence for the defense. It
focused special attention on Arthur Andersen's lawyers and what
they had been telling their client throughout the Enron crisis. Har-
din's strategy made it extremely likely that the jury would have to
review Temple's actions and statements with the greatest of care. If
she should have advised her client that shredding was improper, then
Andersen was in deep trouble. If not, then Andersen might be
exonerated.
IV. THE BALANCE TIPS TO CONVICTION
Despite Hardin's aggressive effort to take the sting out of shred-
ding, it raised serious questions about Andersen's integrity as a firm.
No one on either side disagreed that, as a general matter, it was
unwise to undertake massive document destruction in the midst of a
deepening accounting and auditing crisis. The SEC's Thomas
Newkirk said he had never before seen it done by a "big five" ac-
counting firm. 134 Andersen's straight-talking forensic accountant, and
key government witness, David Stulb, said it was a bad idea and that
he had told Duncan so on October 30.13 Arthur Andersen's SEC
expert and key defense witness, John Riley, had concluded exactly
the same thing and had warned Duncan about document destruction
on October 26.136
Yet shredding on a massive scale had occurred. It had happened
because not one, but several Andersen partners sent out signals that
document destruction was desirable. Although Duncan was the
primary conduit for destruction orders, the critical decision regarding
the matter appeared to have been made before he acted by the
132. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 452, at *55 (testimony of Emily Madison).
133. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 465, at *133 (testimony of John Riley).
134. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 450, at *45 (testimony of Thomas Newkirk).
135. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 463, at *83-*84 (testimony of David Stulb).
136. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 457, at *134 (testimony of John Riley).
20031
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
woman who in both the government's case and the defendant's
response had become the central figure in the affair, Andersen's in-
house counsel, Nancy Temple. She was introduced into the Enron
crisis to render legal advice on September 28. In her notes of October
1, Temple was already asking the key question: "What documents
should we keep?" Her own preliminary answer was telling: "Histori-
cally, keep everything.""' 7 By October 9, Temple had already con-
cluded: "Highly probable some SEC investigation." 138 Despite all
this, on October 12, 2001, Temple sent her fateful memorandum to
Michael Odom of the Enron engagement team suggesting that he
"[remind] the engagement team of our documentation and retention
policy." She also told him: "[I]t will be helpful to make sure that we
have complied with the policy." 139
Odom's reaction to this suggestion was to push the idea of
document destruction, something he had already begun to do on his
own in a continuing education program (captured on video tape and
played at trial) on October 10.140 With counsel's apparent endorse-
ment, the destruction of Andersen's Enron documents began. When
Stewart, Ripepi, Neuhausen, and Green (all members of the PSG)
received Temple's reminder, they began deleting e-mails and elec-
tronic files.1 41 When Duncan saw Enron starting to disintegrate on
October 23, it was to Temple's suggestion that he turned. Temple
provided the apparent legal "blessing" that led accountants through-
out Arthur Andersen to destroy materials that they otherwise would
have been reluctant to shred. Temple's interactions involved even
more than shredding. It was she who redacted Duncan's memoranda
regarding critical meetings with Enron officials and struck Duncan's
warning to Enron that its third-quarter earnings statement was
misleading.
Hardin had, perhaps inadvertently, drawn a line that led directly
to Temple, and her conduct presented Andersen's defenders with a
serious problem. She had, on behalf of the firm, invited document
destruction. One of the few remaining lines of defense was to suggest
that neither Temple nor other Andersen employees had any idea that
137. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 459, at *63 (government document presentation).
138. Id. at *71.
139. Id. at *81-*82.
140. Id. at *75-*78.
141. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 448, at *57, *62-*63 (testimony of Benjamin Neuhausen); id.
2002 Extra LEXIS 469, at *90-91 (testimony of Amy Ripepi); id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 469, at
*153-*55 (testimony of James Green).
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there might soon be an SEC investigation. If no investigation was
anticipated then there could be no intent to obstruct justice by
shredding or deleting documents. The problem with this argument
was that it was hard to believe that sophisticated and experienced
auditors had no idea that the SEC might want to look at their papers.
The seventh largest corporation in America was collapsing. Its
demise was tied to a series of dubious accounting practices. Account-
ing problems would force it to issue a gigantic restatement. All the
witnesses agreed that as soon as a restatement like the one required
of Enron was released, a thorough SEC investigation was a near
certainty.1 42 They also agreed that extensive media reporting and the
significant decline in stock price were likely to trigger an SEC investi-
gation. Despite the media assault on Enron's accounting from
October 17 onwards, the dramatic drop in its stock price at the same
time, the dubious accounting surrounding the Raptor and other
special purpose entities, and the growing awareness of the need for an
enormous restatement, Arthur Andersen's witnesses continued to
insist they had no expectation that an SEC investigation involving
Andersen was likely.
Such a claim was simply not credible. Temple had undermined
such a claim as early as October 9, when she said: "Highly probable
some SEC investigation.' 1 43 As soon as David Stulb took his first
look at the situation on either October 28 or 29, he concluded that
both a restatement and an SEC investigation were inevitable. 1" He
was blunt in his criticism of his colleagues' failure to own up to the
obvious:
[W]e had at least a potential accounting restatement with a billion
dollar plus accounting error; you had potential misrepresentations
being made by the former CFO-or the CFO that was on adminis-
trative leave; you had a credible whistle blower that had brought
forward a number of these facts. And I understand that she had
raised these back in August. I was concerned why it took, you
know, 60-plus days for people to be focusing on it. 145
Arthur Andersen's witnesses' dogged denial of any awareness of
an impending SEC investigation made them sound either incompe-
tent or untruthful. Amy Ripepi, the chief of the PSG, monitored the
142. E.g., id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 466, at *113-*14 (testimony of Carl Bass); id. 2002 Extra
LEXIS 455, at *186 (testimony of David Stulb).
143. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 459, at *71 (government document presentation).
144. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 455, at *192-*96 (testimony of David Stulb).
145. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 463, at *78 (testimony of David Stulb).
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SEC's website on a daily basis. She was an expert in SEC matters. In
her testimony she denied any concern about the SEC until at least
October 20. 46 The government demonstrated that no later than
October 13 she was discussing "the question of an SEC enforcement
action. ' ' 147 This inconsistency raised substantial doubts about her
candor.
Richard Corgel, the most highly placed Andersen official to tes-
tify at trial and the defense's first witness, had a similar problem. He
testified that the Andersen crisis team was unaware of any threat of
SEC investigation throughout most of October. 148 Yet, SEC investi-
gation was an item on the core group's October 23 agenda-a fact
concerning which he had only the lamest explanation.149 Corgel's
credibility problem was compounded because, no later than October
24, he and his group had chosen to send Andersen's top SEC trouble-
shooter, John Riley, to Houston. 150 Why bring in an SEC trouble-
shooter unless you expect SEC trouble? Corgel had no persuasive
answer.
John Riley was Andersen's last witness, the anchor of its case.
He, too, stumbled with respect to the SEC question and thereby
detracted from his credibility. He denied expecting that the SEC
would want Andersen documents when he went to Houston on
October 24.151 He said he was present at Enron headquarters only to
help with accounting issues raised "in the press.15 2 He stated: "I gave
no conscious thought to the SEC up until [November 5]."153 Yet, this
SEC troubleshooting expert, in a deposition in the Sunbeam case, had
testified under oath that a single article in the financial press (in
Enron there had been dozens) would trigger close SEC scrutiny.154
Moreover, Riley's own notes indicated that by October 25 he recog-
nized the likelihood of an Enron restatement and, as a consequence,
an SEC investigation.155 It is difficult to conclude that the jury could
146. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 469, at *60-*62 (testimony of Amy Ripepi).
147. Id at *62-*63.
148. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 461, at *159-*72 (testimony of Richard Corgel).
149. Id. at *169-*72.
150. Id. at *215-*16, *246.
151. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 457, at *123-*24 (testimony of John Riley).
152. Id. at *131.
153. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 465, at *28-*29 (testimony of John Riley).
154. Id. at *71-*72.
155. Id. at *98.
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have been favorably impressed by the tergiversations of Ripepi,
Corgel, and Riley.
Other considerations besides the defendant's suspicious behavior
and Andersen employees' lack of candor seemed to urge a conviction.
Over the course of the trial, it became apparent that the SEC, on its
own, simply did not have the resources to police the behavior of
America's thousands of publicly held corporations. As in so many
other situations in the American scheme of regulation, parties other
than the government are expected to take the lead in uncovering
misconduct.1 6 Spenser Barasch, the government's second witness and
the Associate District Administrator of the SEC's Fort Worth office,
was quite candid about this situation. He testified that it was the Wall
Street Journal's investigative reporting that led his office to begin its
own Enron inquiry. Rusty Hardin was then moved to ask, "Do we
really need the SEC if we have the Wall Street Journal?"'57 Barasch's
earnest reply stressed the fact that the Fort Worth office of the SEC
was "swamped" and was no match for the "batteries of lawyers"
employed by a corporation like Enron.18 Barasch noted that auditors
have far easier access to key corporate documents and can get a much
clearer picture of corporate financial behavior. 59 The defendant's
concluding witness, Riley, had served in the SEC for eleven years. In
a bit of a turnabout on the theme of employee loyalty, he confirmed
that the SEC "can't look at all public companies. They just don't
have the resources."160
If the SEC was institutionally incapable of ongoing supervision
of corporate America, who was left to do the job? Certainly neither
the press nor the plaintiffs' lawyers could fill the role since they were
unlikely to get involved without clear, public signs of trouble. The
proof in the case made it apparent that there was no other option
than to rely on America's auditing industry, especially its largest
accounting firms. Everyone involved in the trial agreed that auditors
156. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
99-104 (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669 (1986); Carl F. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant:
Japan's Changing View Towards Civil Litigation, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BuS. 769, 777-79
(2001).
157. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 450, at *84 (testimony of
Spenser Barasch).
158. Id. at *182-*84.
159. Id. at* 184.
160. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 465, at *143 (testimony of John Riley).
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were charged with the responsibility of protecting the integrity of
corporate fiscal operations and financial reporting on those opera-
tions. The 1934 legislation, adopted to address the abuses that helped
trigger the 1929 stock market crash, mandated annual financial
disclosure statements by publicly owned corporations.161 Such state-
ments are to be based on corporate financial records kept in accor-
dance with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP" in the
parlance of the accounting world) and to be audited in conformity
with generally accepted auditing standards ("GAAS").162 The
depression-era legislation prohibits companies from making materi-
ally false and misleading financial statements to the public. 163
Publicly-traded companies are required to retain auditors to review
company books. In turn, the auditors are obligated to raise questions
about financial statement inaccuracies. If "material" inaccuracies are
found in a public financial statement, the company involved is obliged
to issue a restatement: 64 Auditors are charged by law to be on the
lookout for illegal acts and to police related-party transactions. If
misconduct is discovered, the auditors are required to inform man-
agement and the SEC if the audited company does not correct the
problem.1 65 The SEC is empowered to police not only corporate
compliance with these rules but auditor compliance as well. 66
The jury empanelled in the Andersen case had, along with all
other Americans, just lived through one of the worst periods of
corporate scandal ever experienced. Tyco, WorldCom, Qwest,
Adelphia, Sunbeam, and Waste Management, to name but a few, had
all been tarnished. These companies' troubles paled in comparison to
those of Enron. American business was in a crisis-a crisis that
extended beyond businessmen to the "watchdog" accounting firms
that were supposed to safeguard the system. Accountants had been
swept up in the pursuit of large profits, had lost their independence,
and had become perfunctory in the performance of their duties.
Instead of serving as careful and candid public surrogates, members
of the accounting industry in general, and Arthur Andersen in
particular, had become advocates for their corporate clients. As
advocates they engaged in sharp practices to help corporations
161. ld. 2002 Extra LEXIS 454, at *114-*15 (testimony of Thomas Newkirk).
162. Id. at *121-*22.
163. Id. at *123.
164. Id. at *124.
165. Id. at *126-*27.
166. Id. at *129.
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befuddle regulators and the public. The Raptor partnerships and
other Enron special purpose entities had the look and feel of a clever
ruse. So did Temple's effort to hide what Andersen knew about the
misleading nature of Enron's October quarterly earnings report.
Temple told her outside counsel, Daniel Kolb of the Davis Polk law
firm, that she wanted to edit Duncan's memo because otherwise it
might be said that Andersen "had a responsibility to follow up when
we knew the client had issued a press release that was potentially
misleading."' 167 This is nothing less than a headlong flight from public
responsibility. The integrity of business and health of markets cannot
be maintained if "watchdog" auditors adopt such an approach.
Faced with all this, the jury may have concluded that it had to
send a message to the accounting industry that greater attention to
the public interest was expected. As the government argued in its
closing, watchdogs could not be permitted to shred documents with
impunity or treat the enforcement of the law as a "game." "The
auditor is not supposed to be thinking about whether they [sic] can
out maneuver the SEC."168 Nor could auditing firms and their clients
be allowed to silence the few vigilant accountants among them-
those like Bass, Stevenson, Gutzmacher, and Watkins, willing to raise
the tough questions. In the end, the jury may have concluded that the
only way to clean up the systemic mess was to convict Andersen.
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JURY'S DECISION
Since colonial times, juries have reviewed and legitimated gov-
ernment action in America. 169 In the three-branch system of the
United States, officials of the executive are not free to impose their
view of criminality by fiat. They must convince a court and twelve
ordinary citizens that the law has been violated by accused defendants
and that it is fair to punish those charged. Once the government has
persuaded a jury, the jury's verdict stands as a powerful declaration of
the community's condemnation of the defendant's conduct. In the
Enron debacle, the jury's conviction of Arthur Andersen was a
powerful signal that the misconduct with which Andersen was associ-
ated was, in society's eyes, serious and sanctionable. That determina-
tion opens the way for the government to proceed against the more
167. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 459, at *92 (government document presentation).
168. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 458, at *138 (government closing argument).
169. See Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 592-605 (1993).
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significant criminal targets in the affair, the officers of the Enron
Corporation.
The Andersen conviction legitimated the prosecution of these de-
fendants and displayed the community's willingness to see the law
vigorously applied in their cases. An acquittal might have under-
mined the government's pursuit of Enron. The conviction had the
opposite effect, intimating that the government is likely to succeed in
its efforts to convict Fas,tow and the rest of the Enron gang. At the
same time, the jury's long struggle to reach its verdict should serve to
remind the government that it has to make a good case and that
whatever it presents will be closely scrutinized.
A number of Arthur Andersen's witnesses tried to defend (or at
least explain) the firm's decision to destroy documents as a justified
response to a hostile civil litigation climate in which accounting firms
are constantly being hounded by greedy, unethical, and aggressive
plaintiff's securities litigation firms like the nationally famous (or, in
some circles, infamous) Millberg Weiss.7 0 Richard Corgel, the
highest-ranking Arthur Andersen official to appear at trial, testified
that document destruction was essential to Andersen because "extra-
neous material" could seriously harm the firm."1  Its danger, as
Corgel put it, was that "often times the plaintiff's bar will take infor-
mation out of context and use that as a point of criticism against the
client, against our firm, whatever.' ' 7 Corgel went on to argue that
plaintiff's lawyers do not give accounting firms a "fair hearing" but
twist "small points taken out of context" and use them as a "20/20
hindsight opportunity."'73 This situation, in Corgel's view, justified
aggressive shredding policies.
The fear of plaintiff's lawyers and their lawsuits ran deep at Ar-
thur Andersen. At no fewer than four places in his testimony,
Duncan indicated that his concern with document destruction was
tied not only to the SEC but to plaintiff's law firms. 174 Revealingly, on
every one of those occasions Duncan mentioned "plaintiffs' attor-
neys" or the litigation they file before mentioning concern over an
SEC investigation. Duncan testified that Temple had warned him
170. See Jeffrey Toobin, The Man Chasing Enron, NEW YORKER, Sept. 9, 2002, at 86.
171. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 468, at *55 (testimony of
Richard Corgel).
172. Id. at *55-*56.
173. Id. at *58-*59.
174. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 467, at *66, *144, *151, *164 (testimony of David Duncan).
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about "extraneous documents" because she said: "[T]hey are often
used against us in litigation. A plaintiff lawyers [sic] can take the
most innocent thing and make it seem to be a very, very significant
thing."'75 Duncan appeared to have been powerfully influenced by
this warning. If he seemed "like a deer caught in the headlights, ' 176 as
David Stulb suggested, the onrushing vehicle he thought he saw was
probably plaintiff's lawsuits rather than the SEC.
The same might be said of the Andersen engagement team's Mi-
chael Odom, who stressed private litigation problems when he
counseled wide-ranging document destruction during his videotaped
October 10 training session. It seems no coincidence that Millberg
Weiss filed a suit against Enron (a fact widely reported within Ander-
sen) 177 on October 23, just as Duncan was reaching his decision to
encourage shredding. The jury appeared to reject the blame-it-on-
the-plaintiff's-bar argument propounded by Andersen's employees.
That rejection might be said to be a vindication of the civil enforce-
ment process presently in operation across America. Accounting
firms will not be permitted to shred documents, dissemble, or justify
misconduct because they fear the likes of Millberg Weiss.
The jury's decision came at a time when the rules regulating ac-
countants were in flux. In response to the Enron fiasco, Congress
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, designed, among other things, to
tighten the regulation of accounting firms. 178 To that end, a board was
created to rewrite rules of accounting practice. This will be a difficult
undertaking and the accounting industry has already impeded the
effort by torpedoing the first proposed chair of the new accounting
board because of his reputation as a serious reformer (a move that,
indirectly, led to the resignation of SEC head, Harvey Pitt). 79 The
jury's reaction to the Arthur Andersen story is at least one signal that
real reform is desired by the American people. Accounting is esoteric
and much of it goes on in contexts screened from public view. It
would, however, be a mistake on the part of the industry to believe
that it can avoid addressing the serious problems disclosed by the
Enron/Andersen mess. The jury's verdict and the many successes of
175. Id. at*161.
176. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 463, at *96-*97 (testimony of David Stulb).
177. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 459, at *154-*55 (government document presentation).
178. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 103, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
179. See Stephen Labaton, Bitter Divide as Securities Panel Picks an Accounting Watchdog,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2002, at Al; Stephen Labaton, In Stormy Time, S.E.C. Is Facing Deeper
Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002, at Al.
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plaintiff's firms in securities cases demonstrate continuing community
dissatisfaction with an accounting industry that has sacrificed inde-
pendence in the pursuit of ever-fatter fees. Accountants like Ander-
sen's Duncan and his counsel Temple are not bad people, but the jury
verdict suggests that they have lost sight of their public obligations
and basic moral tenets like those regarding truthfulness.
On a more prosaic level, the lesson of the jury's decision is that
the updated obstruction of justice statute,18° enacted in 1982 to widen
restrictions on document destruction, 8 ' means what it says: destruc-
tion is barred as soon as a party has reasonable grounds to believe
that an official inquiry is foreseeable.1 82 The notion that a holder of
documents is free to do anything he or she wishes with them until
presented with a subpoena has been exploded. John Coffee, Jr., the
distinguished securities law scholar, has argued that Andersen's
critical mistake in the wake of Enron's meltdown was its failure to
understand that the obstruction of justice laws had changed.183
Temple and others at Andersen behaved as if destruction were
proper until a court or agency told them to stop. In the wake of the
1982 legislation, that approach was based on clearly erroneous legal
analysis. Moreover, such an approach could yield not only an ob-
struction of justice conviction, but also a presumption of fraud under
the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.184 Ignorance of the
law, as the old refrain goes, is no excuse, and a jury of twelve Housto-
nians so reminded Arthur Andersen.
The Andersen conviction also demonstrated that American juries
will accept the treatment of wayward corporations and accounting
firms as criminal enterprises. The genteel approach that featured
slaps on the wrist and stern warnings about future consequences 85 has
given way to unrelenting prosecution. The Houston jury, albeit
reluctantly, accepted that shift. The government removed its kid
gloves in the Andersen case. It treated Andersen like a common
criminal and played "hardball" in its effort to win a conviction. The
180. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2002).
181. For a brief history of this section, see Coffee, supra note 96, at A19.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2002).
185. See Lynn Cowan & Cheryl Winokur Mynk, Andersen: Called to Account: Criminal
Charges Threaten Auditor's Survival, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2002, at C15; Gary Young, When a
Business Stands in the Dock Conviction Isn't the End of the World, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 2002, at
Al.
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government stressed Andersen's "prior bad acts" as if Andersen were
a three-strikes bank robber. The government tenaciously pressed its
case. It was willing to point an accusing finger at Harvard-trained
lawyers and high-ranking accountants as "corrupt persuaders." All of
this signals that the climate in business failure and accounting mis-
conduct cases has changed substantially-a change that the govern-
ment could not accomplish without the endorsement of the jury.
The Andersen prosecution may prove to be a seminal event. In a
number of important ways it is the mirror image of an earlier water-
shed case, the trial of Peter Zenger.186 In that 1734 prosecution, the
government took a vague law (one prohibiting the publication of
seditious libel) and sought to use it to control the colonial press. A
jury was told that it was required to convict if the defendant, Zenger,
had published the offending article -a document the judge ruled was
libelous on its face. The jury refused to accept the case as a slam-
dunk (Zenger had published the piece) and acquitted the defendant.
Its determination squelched a politically motivated campaign to
muzzle the press. In Andersen, the government took an exceedingly
vague obstruction of justice statute and sought to apply it in the
politically charged prosecution of a major accounting firm. The jury,
after hearing about the problems in the accounting industry (at least
those touching Andersen) and the dubious behavior of the defendant,
decided that the government could use its ill-defined statute to punish
the accounting firm. Interestingly, however, as in Zenger, no piece of
proof would be treated as automatically dispositive (in Andersen,
Duncan's confession was claimed to have the same sort of dispositive
power as ascribed to Zenger's technically libelous article). In both
cases it was the jury's decision that was key to establishing the reach
of the law and an appropriate social agenda. The Houston jury
opened the door to much broader regulation of accountants and
business. Time will tell if this was a watershed step. If so, it was one
that only a jury could legitimate.
VI. CONCERNS ABOUT GOVERNMENT MISCONDUCT ARISING FROM
THE ANDERSEN CONVICTION
The Andersen case did more than send a powerful message about
corporate governance and auditor integrity: it raised a series of
186. See Paul Finkelman, The Zenger Case: Prototype of a Political Trial, in AMERICAN
POLITICAL TRIALS 21-42 (Michael R. Belknap ed., 1981).
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questions about the proper limits of governmental zeal in hard-fought
cases with vast political ramifications. Unfortunately, a number of
the steps that the government took threaten to erode the fairness of
American jury trials. As already noted, the prosecutors were ex-
tremely aggressive in introducing "other crimes evidence." From the
outset of the case through the closing arguments, United States
attorneys repeatedly made reference to the Waste Management and
Sunbeam cases. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) dictates when a
litigant may use other crimes evidence against an opponent as part of
its case on the merits (in other words, for some purpose other than
impeachment). The rule states:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. -Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admis-
sible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, in-
tent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prose-
cution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance
of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good
cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial.187
The rule prohibits the use of other crimes evidence to show an
accused's general propensity to engage in criminal activity.188 The
idea is that jurors should not be encouraged to engage in did-it-
before-at-it-again (or recidivist) thinking. The reason for the ban is
that such proof is extremely powerful and likely to prejudice a fact
finder against a defendant. Empirical studies have found that both
jurors and judges are likely to be powerfully and negatively influ-
enced by other crimes and prior conviction evidence, to the point
where they will become unfairly dismissive of a targeted defendant's
witnesses and arguments.18 9
The evidentiary dilemma is that, sometimes, other crimes evi-
dence can be highly revealing, as when it supplies "proof of motive."
In the Andersen litigation, the government succeeded in introducing
powerfully incriminating evidence regarding the Waste Management
and Sunbeam matters on the theory that these cases provided a
187. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
188. See generally Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of
Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777 (1981).
189. See HARRY KALVEN JR. & HAN ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 124 (1966); Roselle
Wissler & Michael Saks, On the Inefficiency of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior
Conviction Evidence to Decide Guilt, 9 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1985).
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motive for Andersen to act as it did in regard to Enron. 190 The
government argued that the SEC put Andersen on a sort of "proba-
tion" because of its misdeeds in the two earlier cases and that Ander-
sen was so fearful of being held to have violated the terms of its
probation that it undertook document destruction to hide the fact of
its breach. 191
The theory that Waste Management and Sunbeam provided An-
dersen with a motive for shredding is legitimate. Yet, it imposed
limits on what sort of use the government might make of the facts
underlying the earlier misconduct. The government was clearly
entitled to use the prior cases to show that particular Andersen
employees were worried about the firm's probationary status when
Enron started to spin out of control. The government might go
further and show what the consequences were likely to be if the firm
were held to have violated its probation. What the government was
prohibited from doing under the terms of Rule 404(b) and its motive
theory was dwell on the underlying facts of Waste Management and
Sunbeam or suggest that Andersen was up to its old tricks with
Enron.
Unfortunately, in its grim determination to secure victory, the
government misused the Waste Management and Sunbeam evidence
for propensity purposes. Whenever the government wanted to
blacken Andersen's reputation, it hauled out the prior cases. When
Amy Ripepi resisted agreeing with the government about problems at
Andersen (apparently because of her loyalty to the firm), the gov-
ernment threw Waste Management and Sunbeam in her face. 192 It was
as if these cases were trotted out to show that Andersen was a bad
firm. This is precisely what Rule 404(b) does not allow. In addition,
in its case-in-chief, the government had one of the investigating FBI
agents, Barbara Jeanne Sullivan, present documents setting forth, in
full detail, the Waste Management charges lodged by the SEC against
Andersen.193 The government made a number of points about the
Waste Management case. Andersen had given its corporate client,
Waste Management, a clean bill of health for a number of years.
Andersen and Waste Management were extremely close (having
190. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 459, at *33-*40 (evidentiary
hearing).
191. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 458, at *55 (government closing argument).
192. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 469, at *56-*57 (testimony of Amy Ripepi).
193. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 459, at *29-*32, *43-*45.
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worked together for more than twenty years). What brought down
Waste Management was "aggressive" accounting that eventually led
to an accounting restatement that drastically reduced pretax profits
(by $1.43 billion); Andersen partners were directly implicated in the
entire mess.194 These facts had nothing to do with motive in the
Enron case; instead, they demonstrated how similar the two cases
were. The government appeared to be encouraging the jurors to
make the forbidden assumption- did-it-before-and-were-at-it-again.
The United States Supreme Court in a somewhat different legal
context recently condemned such invitations in Old Chief v. United
States.19'
The government was not satisfied simply to set its dubious evi-
dence before the jury. In its closing, the prosecution made extensive
arguments about Waste Management and Sunbeam. It claimed that
the cases served as "road maps" to Enron with Andersen partners
signing-off on dubious audits for years, only to have their clients
eventually face the need to make gigantic financial restatements
resulting in fiscal crisis, SEC investigation, and ruin. 96 This argument
is improper. It is a propensity claim in its baldest form. The problem
was not cured by the fact that the government went on to make
reference to its "probation" motive theory. The defense complained
bitterly at every opportunity about the government's inflammatory
evidence ploy. It "beseeched" the judge not to give the jury any
404(b) instruction because it feared that such an instruction would
only remind the jury of the prejudicial material.197 The court ignored
the defendant's plea.
The question is: why did the government take this tack and make
improper use of the Waste Management and Sunbeam evidence? It is
hard to escape the conclusion that the government had decided to
"dirty up" Andersen, to make it appear to be a rogue accounting firm.
The government team clearly felt enormous pressure to win a convic-
tion and seemed willing to take dubious steps to succeed. Moreover,
the government had little concern that there might be an appellate
reversal because a conviction would drive Andersen out of business
194. Id.
195. 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (deciding not to allow elements of prior similar crime to be made
known to the jury).
196. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 458, at *50-*51 (government
closing argument).
197. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 465, at *208-*09 (second precharge conference).
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long before any court of appeals could rule on the case. 198 If this
analysis is correct, it suggests a prosecutorial win-at-all-costs attitude
that is antithetical to American notions of fairness and presents a real
threat of causing a miscarriage of justice.
Two lesser but still serious issues were raised by the govern-
ment's approach to other evidentiary problems. The first of these
involved application of the hearsay rule and the second involved the
invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. As to the
first, the prosecution took the position that any word uttered at any
time by any Arthur Andersen employee was an admission by the
defendant that could be offered into evidence by the government.199
The government insisted, however, that the defendant was prohibited
by the hearsay rule from offering precisely the same sort of materials
because it was hearsay.
While there is solid support in the rules of evidence for such an
approach as a general matter, in the Andersen case the government,
with the approval of Judge Harmon, pressed the principle to a
troubling extreme. Addressing the admissibility of documentary
materials, Department of Justice Attorney Andrew Weissman
declared: "[I]f I have any witness who says they're Arthur Andersen
[statements] that's an admission by the partnership."2°° Rusty Har-
din's response was: "This is shameless. '20 1 Why it might be "shame-
less" became clear when the government started introducing
statements like the civil trial deposition of Andersen partner Tom
Bauer. This deposition was taken after Bauer had been placed on
administrative leave by Andersen and the community of interest
between employer and employee had been broken.20 2 These facts
notwithstanding, the court admitted Bauer's deposition.
The use of Bauer's words against Andersen was disturbing. They
were spoken after the two had, more or less, parted ways. Bauer had
every reason to seek to protect himself at Andersen's expense. Since
Bauer had invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify at
the Houston trial, there was absolutely no opportunity for Andersen
198. The only real risk for the government was that the trial judge might declare a mistrial.
Judge Harmon's apparent sympathy for the government substantially reduced this constraint on
government action. It should be noted, however, that what little remains of Andersen has
appealed the conviction. See United States v. Arthur Andersen, No. 02-21200 (5th Cir.).
199. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
200. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 463, at *125.
201. Id.
202. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 460, at *2-*3 (evidentiary hearing).
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to cross-examine him. The defendant was thus deprived of any real
right to confront the witness. When Andersen sought to show what
absent witnesses, like Bauer, had said by offering their e-mails or
other out of court statements, the government invoked the hearsay
rule to bar their admission. The result was a one-sided presentation
tilted to the government's advantage.
This was the case when Hardin sought to introduce a particular
Temple e-mail. The government argued that the e-mail was hearsay,
and the court excluded it on that ground. Hardin declared himself
"dumbfounded" by the ruling.23 His reaction seems justified. Not
only was the government regularly using analogous materials (it
would that same day introduce a series of Temple e-mails),2°4 but
Hardin needed this evidence to explain the motives of key but
unavailable actors like Temple. The one-way hearsay bar unfairly
deprived the defense of critical evidence. In Chambers v. Missis-
sippi,205 the Supreme Court ruled that such one-way application of the
hearsay rule can pose the most serious sort of due process questions.
Those questions were not carefully weighed at Andersen's trial.
It is widely accepted that jurors should not be informed that wit-
nesses have chosen to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege to
refuse to testify.2°6 This has been the practice because there is felt to
be a danger that jurors informed of a witness's refusal to testify will
embrace an adverse inference about the guilt of the witness and those
with whom he or she is associated. In the Andersen case, the gov-
ernment sought to have the jury informed that Temple, Bauer, and a
woman named Kate Agnew (a manager on the Enron account) had
invoked the Fifth Amendment.2 7 The government's justification for
this request was that jurors might otherwise make adverse assump-
tions about its failure to produce these witnesses. 2°8 While the gov-
ernment's argument was not frivolous, it fell well short of justifying
203. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 469, at *17-*18 (testimony of Amy Ripepi).
204. Id. at *90.
205. 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (stating that requirements of due process may overcome traditional
hearsay barriers).
206. See Richard B. Schmitt & Jonathan Weil, Prosecutors Seek Unusual Directive:
Andersen Judge Is Asked to Permit as Evidence Workers' Refusal to Testify, WALL ST. J., May
24, 2002, at C13; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 913 (2002); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965); Charles R. Nesson & Michael J. Leotta, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Cross-
Examination, 85 GEO. L.J. 1627 (1997).
207. Andersen Transcript, supra note 17, 2002 Extra LEXIS 463, at *139 (evidentiary
hearing).
208. Id.
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the risk that jurors might view Andersen employees as criminals
seeking to hide behind the Fifth Amendment. The court's solution to
the problem was to instruct jurors that the named witnesses were
absent for reasons of no relevance to the case.2°9 This was fairer but
still posed the risk of adverse juror reaction. The government's call
for disclosure came worryingly close to inviting jurors to condemn the
use of the right to silence. Insensitivity to or impatience with this
right signals, once again, the government's apparent disregard for the
risk of an improper conviction. In the Andersen case it suggests a
prosecution team too willing to win at any cost.
The government pursued at least one more alarming evidentiary
strategy. It focused a significant part of its case on the fact that
Arthur Andersen, and later, its employees, expended a great deal of
effort on securing legal advice. In questioning both Bass and Ripepi,
the government repeatedly underscored the point that by October 8,
2001, Andersen had "retained a large New York law firm to assist
with this Enron situation. '210 The firm involved was Davis Polk,
known for its skill in representing those accused of white-collar crime
and accounting infractions. When Hardin began his Ripepi cross-
examination, he highlighted this point by asking: "How many times
do you think he used the words 'big New York law firm'? '21  The
government's preoccupation with Andersen's use of counsel also was
evident when prosecutors reviewed Temple's notes212 and when an
FBI agent was asked to testify about an interview conducted with
Davis Polk partner Dan Kolb.213
When it came time for the government to cross-examine, it once
again made repeated use of Andersen's and its witnesses' felt need
for legal advice. Richard Corgel was asked by the government
attorney cross-examining him whether his personal lawyers were
present in the courtroom.214 He admitted that they were. The gov-
ernment then questioned Corgel about Andersen's hiring of the
Davis Polk firm and about the fact that Temple had been a partner
specializing in litigation at a prestigious Chicago law firm (Sidley &
209. Id.
210. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 466, at *167 (testimony of Amy Ripepi); id. at *108 (testimony of
Carl Bass); id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 469, at *34 (testimony of Amy Ripepi).
211. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 469, at *132 (testimony of Amy Ripepi).
212. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 459, at *220-21.
213. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 460, at *33-*34, *119 (testimony of Paula Schanzle).
214. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 468, at *5 (testimony of Richard Corgel).
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Austin) before joining Andersen.25 The government also pursued the
Davis Polk issue with the last defense witness, John Riley. Although
Riley claimed he had paid little attention to the fact, the government
again underscored the point that Andersen had brought in high-
powered lawyers at an early date.2 16
In its closing, the government argued that Andersen should have
known better than to destroy documents because it had "armies of
lawyers working for them, a whole department of lawyers." '217 The
government then went further and attacked the lawyers suggesting
that "Andersen's legal department was the driving force behind
this." '218 The government claimed that lawyers had engineered the
document destruction as part of a scheme to help Andersen avoid
liability for Enron's collapse. That, suggested government counsel,
was why Temple was assigned to the matter on September 28.219 That
was why Davis Polk was brought in on October 8 and why the mid-
October memos were edited.20 Hardin felt himself obliged to defend
the lawyers and the "system set up to protect the communication
between attorney and client." 221 The government had pressed its
lawyer-bashing theme so vigorously that defense counsel had to
defend not just his client but the system itself.
The trouble with the government's attack on Andersen's use of
lawyers is that it suggested that seeking legal advice is an inherently
suspicious act which a jury is entitled to use as incriminating evidence
and that due process, as often insisted upon by lawyers, is an impedi-
ment to "real" justice. The government's case had far too much
lawyer bashing for it to have been accidental. The government's
impatience with the defendant's mounting of a legal defense might be
construed as its invitation to the jury to punish Andersen for putting
up a fight.
This sort of invitation is demagogic and improper. It seeks the
condemnation of any who choose vigorously to defend themselves. It
seems to be consistent with the government's aversion to the use of
legal process in terrorist-related cases2 22 and its more general antipa-
215. Id. at *129.
216. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 457, at *211-*12 (testimony of John Riley).
217. Id. 2002 Extra LEXIS 458, at *37.
218. Id. at *38.
219. Id. at *88-*89.
220. Id. at *91.
221. Id.
222. See Anthony Lewis, Bush and Iraq, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Nov. 7, 2002, at 4.
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thy towards lawyers and litigation.223 The same impatience with legal
process and disrespect for adversarial methods appears to have
undergirded recent SEC proposals that were designed to limit confi-
dentiality between lawyers and clients in the corporate setting.224
What Temple did may have actually constituted obstruction of justice,
but that does not mean that whoever the government accuses is guilty
or should be intimidated from seeking counsel and offering a defense.
The jury may not have been swept away by the government's lawyer
bashing, but the prosecutors stooped very low indeed in their desper-
ate effort to win a conviction.
VII. A JUDGMENT ON JURY TRIALS -THE ANDERSEN CASE
A single case can never provide a definitive benchmark concern-
ing the value of the jury trial system. Anecdotes are subject to far too
many caveats to be considered conclusive. 225  Yet anecdotes can
provide some useful insights, especially when they reinforce historical
and empirical data. The Andersen trial supports a number of the
arguments made in favor of the jury. Twelve ordinary Texans were
asked to decide a complex and hard-fought case that followed on the
heels of months of press coverage. They did not appear to be over-
whelmed by either the difficulty or the celebrity of the case. They
deliberated with care and patience for more than ten days. They
appeared to display sensitivity to subtle questions of credibility and to
cast aside a number of dubious government arguments. They did not
appear to be overawed by press assertions of wrongdoing or to be
swayed by the piling up of other crimes evidence. The jury displayed
an awareness of the enormous consequences for Andersen and put
the government to the proof.
No government attorney reviewing the Andersen case should be
overly sanguine about the prospects of convicting politically targeted
defendants. The jury insisted on hard proof and plenty of it. This is
exactly what the framers of the Constitution hoped for when they
guaranteed the right to jury trial in criminal cases. The jury in the
Andersen case stood as a check to prosecutorial enthusiasm. Yet, the
government won. It won, I would suggest, because Andersen and the
223. Id. at 5.
224. Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
17 C.F.R. Part 205, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8150htm.
225. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System- and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1159-62 (1992).
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whole accounting industry had failed to do its job-a job that no one
else in America can do. The Andersen jury served as a kind of
spokesperson for a polity tired of the evasion of rules designed to
insure the honest operation of business in America. Sharp practices
by sophisticated accountants on behalf of wealthy corporations are
not acceptable.
It is too soon to tell if the Andersen decision is the bellwether it
seems to be. Many more cases remain to be decided, and the way
they are sorted out will powerfully affect our future approach to
business and financial crime. Yet, Andersen seems to suggest that the
current era of boardroom chicanery is drawing to a close.
The report is not, however, altogether rosy. The government
yielded to political and social pressure and adopted tactics that are
open to serious criticism. It offered an array of potentially inflamma-
tory other crimes evidence, abused the strictures of the hearsay rule
to create a one-sided impression of Andersen employee conduct, and
attempted to draw inappropriate attention to the fact that the defen-
dant and its employees had sought the advice of counsel. The efforts
targeting lawyers are especially troubling. They seem to be tied to a
more general governmental animosity towards the rule of law. They
also seem to be connected to both regulatory and political efforts to
vilify lawyers and the protections they provide. Only time will tell
whether the benefits of Andersen's conviction outweigh these very
real costs. The jury did its part. The question remains whether the
government can perform with equal integrity and good sense.
[Vol 78:1203
